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Little  is known  about  the behavior  of Madrassa  (Islamic  religious  seminaries)  students,  and
how  other  groups  in their communities  interact  with  them.  To investigate  this,  we use
data from  economic  decision-making  experiments  embedded  in  a survey  that we collected
from students  pursuing  bachelors-equivalent  degrees  in  Madrassas  and  other  educational
institutions  of distinct  religious  tendencies  and  socioeconomic  background  in  Pakistan.
First,  we  do not  ﬁnd  that  Madrassa  students  are  less  trusting  of  others;  in  fact, they  exhibit
the  highest  level  of  other-regarding  behavior,  and  expect  others  to be the  most  trustworthy.
Second,  there  is a high  level  of  trust among  all groups.  Third,  within  each  institution  group,
we fail  to  ﬁnd  evidence  of  in-group  bias  or  systematic  out-group  bias  either  in trust  or tastes.
Fourth,  we  ﬁnd  that  students  from  certain  backgrounds  under-estimate  the  trustworthiness
of  Madrassa  students.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
Madrassas – Islamic religious seminaries – have received considerable attention recently, especially since 9/11 and the
005 London bombing. Despite scant research, claims made by policy makers and in the popular press suggest that they may
e responsible for fostering militancy, Islamic extremism, international and national terrorism and violence. Madrassas have
ometimes been labeled as “weapons of mass instruction” or “factories for global jihad”, and as such have been perceived
s a threat for the West and for individual countries hosting them (Rashid, 2000; Stern, 2000; Malik, 2008; Rahman, 2008;
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Ali, 2009; Cherti et al., 2011). As a result, the United States has been encouraging Madrassa reform in the Muslim world,
particularly in Pakistan where Madrassas are thought to be linked to the Taliban (The 9/11 Commission, 2004; Fair, 2008).2
Madrassas are widespread around the world and educate an estimated 6 million Muslims (Haqqani, 2004). In Pakistan
alone, some estimates suggest that nearly 2 million students attend Madrassas (Candland, 2008). Many Madrassa graduates
go on to play an important religious and political leadership role in their communities (Malik, 2008), and are therefore
important social and economic actors. Despite their alleged ties to extremists both nationally and internationally, and the
major inﬂuence they play in their communities, we know very little about the behavior of young men  attending Madrassas,
the causal impact of Madrassas in shaping their students’ behavior, and how other groups in their communities interact with
these students. This is primarily because Madrassas tend to be closed institutions and data on their students is extremely
rare. In this paper, we use unique experimental data that we collected from Madrassa students and from students in other
educational institutions in Pakistan to investigate how Madrassa students and other members of the Pakistani society
interact with each other. The Pakistani setting is particularly well-suited to investigate the behavior of Madrassa students
since: (1) Madrassas are a non-trivial player in the educational landscape of the society (Winthrop and Graff, 2010), (2) as
we document later, religious institutions are perceived by the general Pakistani population to be playing a major role in
cultivating extremism and violence, and (3) the Pakistani society is one that is rife with violence, and polarized along social,
religious, and ethnic lines, and where as a result multiple social identities may  co-exist.
To better understand how members of the Pakistani society interact with each other, we take an indirect approach
and focus on students’ interactions in several economic decision-making experiments.3 These experiments measure trust
(trust game), expected trustworthiness (expectations in the trust game), and unconditional other-regarding behavior such
as altruism or inequity aversion (dictator game). Trust has been shown to be important for intergroup reconciliation and
negotiations (Lichbach, 2005; Nadler and Liviatan, 2006), and to lead to lower levels of militancy (Uslaner et al., 2004).
Exhibiting other-regarding behavior may  be negatively correlated with exhibiting hatred, which has been proposed to be
one of the contributing causes of terrorism and violence (Sternberg, 2003). In addition, trust has also been shown to enhance
efﬁciency and to promote economic growth and ﬁnancial development (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Putnam,
2000; Guiso et al., 2004), especially in a setting like Pakistan where institutions are failing (Ostrom, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995).
Our experiments measure aspects that are therefore likely to be important for the decision to engage in violence, and for
the well-functioning of a society more generally.
In this setting, we study how Madrassa students, who tend to come from modest origins, exhibit high levels of religiosity,
and are thought to be exposed to teachings that reject Western ideas (Rahman, 2008), interact with individuals from diverse
religious and socioeconomic backgrounds, and varied exposure to Western ideas. We  analyze their interactions with two
other disparate groups of Pakistani youth. The ﬁrst consists of students from Islamic Universities that teach, in gender-
segregated campuses, a Liberal Arts curriculum combined with Islamic teachings. The second group comprises of students
from Liberal Universities that are similar to American universities – classes are taught in English, campuses are mixed,
tuition is expensive, and students are widely exposed to Western ideas. There is substantial sorting on socioeconomic
characteristics and very different levels of religiosity and exposure to Western ideas across the institutional settings. We
focus on interactions of inter-elite groups, deﬁned as college-level students, because individuals belonging to these groups
will eventually become policy makers and dictate future policy, so understanding their behavior is of particular relevance.
We chose those three groups (Madrassa, Islamic University, and Liberal University students) since they clearly represent
different social and religious identities within Pakistani society and we would therefore expect a priori tensions between
them.
We recruited 1521 male students pursuing bachelors-equivalent degrees from (i) four Madrassas, (ii) one Islamic Uni-
versity, and (iii) two Liberal Universities for our study. We  randomly matched students with each other to participate in
several economic decision-making experiments to analyze how the various groups interact with each other. Each student
is, however, matched with only one other student belonging to a speciﬁed institution. Our study design allows us to observe
differences in decisions both across groups and within group as the institution type of the participant’s partner is varied.
This enables us to investigate whether there is any systematic difference in behavior by groups – more precisely, whether
Madrassa students interact with their peers differently than with others, in particular those who  may  be perceived to be
widely inﬂuenced by the West, and whether other groups of the society treat Madrassa students differently. Through our
experiment, we seek to clarify ﬁve main questions: (1) Does behavior in the trust game vary by group? (2) Do students exhibit
an in-group bias and is there differential treatment (discrimination) in terms of behavior against a particular group? (3) Is
there taste-based discrimination against a group? (4) Is there systematic difference in expected trustworthiness (stereotype)
against a particular group? (5) Are the stereotypes about each group’s perceived trustworthiness correct?
Analysis of the experiments reveals several interesting ﬁndings. First, there is a high level of trust among all groups, with
students enrolled at Madrassas, on average, being amongst those who  exhibit the most trusting behavior. Second, for all
2 The (perceived) dubious role of Madrassas has also been one of the factors prompting the US and the UK to direct large amount of foreign aid to reform
the  Pakistani education system. For example, between 2002 and 2008, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) invested over $682
million to reform Pakistan’s education system (Bajoria, 2013).
3 Results from laboratory experiments that measure social capital and pro-social preferences have been found to be informative about behavior in
real-world situations (Karlan, 2005; Benz and Meier, 2008; Baran et al., 2010).
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roups, we ﬁnd no evidence of in-group bias or systematic discrimination in the trust game. While we  ﬁnd no difference in
rust game behavior by match type (i.e., by the institution of the student with whom the participant is matched), students
ould still exhibit different levels of trust and preferences toward certain groups as a range of factors may  motivate a student’s
ecision-making in the trust game.4 These include unconditional other-regarding preferences, beliefs about trustworthiness
f the partner, and risk preferences (Cox, 2004). We  examine these factors by studying how participants’ decisions carry
ver to the dictator game (played by the student with the same match). The dictator game allows us to test for differences in
nconditional other-regarding preferences (taste-based preferences). Here too, we  ﬁnd no evidence of in-group or systematic
ut-group bias. But we ﬁnd that Madrassa students give the most.
We do, however, ﬁnd important differences in expected trustworthiness across the groups. Our data on subjective expec-
ations – beliefs of how much students think was  sent back to their peers, on average, by other students in the matched
nstitution in the trust game – that measure expected trustworthiness reveal that students from Liberal Universities expect
adrassa students to send back less relative to other groups. Moreover, these beliefs held about Madrassa students are sta-
istically very different and lower than the amount that Madrassa students actually send back. These incorrect expectations
or stereotypes) could negatively inﬂuence the social and economic interactions of those two  groups outside of the lab. We
lso ﬁnd that Madrassa students have the highest levels of expectations of the trustworthiness of other groups, and they
ver-estimate the trustworthiness of Liberal University students. Notably, variation in observable characteristics (within
nstitution) is not correlated with the mismatch in expectations regarding trustworthiness.
In summary, our results show that Madrassa students treat all the groups we  consider equally, as do students belonging to
ther groups. Madrassa students, therefore, do not stand out as discriminating against students from institutions with strong
estern inﬂuence.5 An important question that follows is whether Madrassa students’ pro-social behavior can be attributed
o Madrassa attendance or to characteristics that lead students to attend a Madrassa in the ﬁrst place (i.e., selection). Selection
nto Madrassas would be an issue only if one believes that students enrolling in Madrassas are even more trusting and pro-
ocial prior to entry than levels that we observe. However, given the very high levels of trust and pro-social behavior in the
ata, this is quite unlikely. Regardless, we argue that the behavior of Madrassa students cannot be explained by selection
nto Madrassas on observable characteristics. While we  cannot directly address the extent to which sorting on unobservables
ay  drive our results (due to the lack of credible exogenous variation in Madrassa attendance), such sorting would have to
e quite severe to reverse our conclusions. Our ﬁndings, overall, cast doubt on the general perception that Madrassas teach
atred and ideological extremism – at least with regards to groups within the Pakistani society – and is consistent with
adrassas promoting religious teachings and offering an environment that emphasizes selﬂessness.6
Our paper shows how distinct groups within the Pakistani society interact with each other – something that is crucial for
he functioning of the society. Given the current divide of the society, the omnipresent violence, and the perception of the
akistani general population that religious institutions are playing a role in cultivating violence, our result of equal treatment
s quite striking. The ﬁndings that Madrassa students show very high levels of pro-social behavior toward all groups and
re also very trusting cast doubt on the widely-held view that Madrassas (or their students) are primarily responsible for
omestic violence. It is important to note that the Madrassas we  surveyed are mainstream and in urban centers. Since most
adrassas are similar to the ones in the study and most prominent Madrassas are located in urban centers, our ﬁndings
ould extend to the vast majority of those institutions in Pakistan. Because there is a lot of heterogeneity across geography
nd ideology, we do not know how our ﬁndings would extend to less mainstream Madrassas. However, the fundamental
uestion pertains to the role of Madrassas as an institution. That requires investigating the behavior of mainstream Madrassa
tudents, since they are the ones representative of that institution. Fringe Madrassas are, by deﬁnition, not representative of
he majority of Madrassas. Therefore, we believe our ﬁndings contribute to our understanding of the behavior of Madrassa
tudents. The implications of our results are, however, unclear for the role of Madrassas in international violence, since we
o not match students with foreign (particularly, Western) individuals. Thus, we  do not know how our results would extend
o interactions with groups outside of Pakistan. In addition, one should be cautious in generalizing our results to interactions
f less educated or non-Muslim groups in Pakistan.7
4 For example, Liberal University students may  invest similarly in the trust game with Madrassa students and students from their own institution.
owever, the underlying preferences and tastes could be very different. Even if Liberal University students believe Madrassa students are less trustworthy
when  compared to students at their own institution), they may  invest with them equally because of inequality aversion (since Madrassa students generally
ail  from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds) or other unconditional social preferences.
5 Our sample includes Madrassas belonging to the Deobandi and Barelvi schools of thought – the two  main interpretive traditions of Sunni Islam. Since
eobandi Madrassas are generally believed to be more militant (Talbot, 2009; Winthrop and Graff, 2010), we test for whether the behavior of Madrassa
tudents differs across the two interpretive traditions: Our analysis reveals no systematic heterogeneity in the behavior of students of the two Madrassa
ypes.
6 Note, however, that trust and other-regarding behavior need not be the exact opposite of hatred. Only if they are negatively related, would high trust
nd/or  other-regarding behavior mean less hatred.
7 Focusing on college-level students allow us to isolate the effect of attending different types of institutions (abstracting from the effect of education
evel)  on behavior. With regards to the affect of education on behavior, Helliwell and Putnam (2007) ﬁnd that increases in average education levels improve
rust,  while Milligan et al. (2004) ﬁnd that education leads to increased civic sense. On the other hand, Algan et al. (2011) ﬁnd that teaching practices (such
s  lecture versus work group) inﬂuence student beliefs about cooperation.
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Because of the very distinct social identity of the three groups that we  study, our paper ﬁts within the literature that
focuses on group identity and behavior.8 This literature can be divided into two  major strands: one that uses induced group
membership, and the other that examines the effects of existing groups, such as ethnic groups, clans, and residential groups,
on behavior. The ﬁrst typically ﬁnds evidence of a strong impact of group membership on individual behavior (see for,
example, Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Heap and Zizzo, 2009; Sutter, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2010b), while the
second shows more mixed results (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Bernhard et al., 2006; Falk and Zehnder, 2007).9 Our paper
uses the latter approach and investigates the behavior of existing groups. Although controlling for selection into groups
makes the causal inference of group membership harder to identify (an issue avoided when group membership is randomly
induced, and mitigated in our context by using an instrumental variable approach for Madrassa attendance), using existing
groups is a valuable approach to understanding the interactions of relevant social and economic actors from a policy and
real-world perspective.
With real groups, the impact of group membership on behavior is more varied. For example, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)
match Israeli students with objectively-recognizable ethnic names and ﬁnd strong evidence of discrimination against Eastern
Jews by both Ashkenazic and Eastern Jews in the trust game. Similar results are found in the social psychology literature
when groups are unequal, in which case the disadvantaged group often favors the out-group (e.g., Jost et al., 2004; Brown,
2000).10 While our paper takes a similar approach as Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), our context is made unique by having
two dimensions of inequality: religiosity and socioeconomic status, both of which are valued by the Pakistani society.11,12
Moreover, these two dimensions are negatively correlated: Liberal University students are the highest social status group
when judged by socioeconomic characteristics but the lowest status group when judged on the metric of religiosity, and the
reverse is true for Madrassa students. This may  explain why these two  groups trust more and exhibit more other-regarding
behavior than the Islamic University students, who  fare in the middle on both scales. The interaction between the two
dimensions of social status may  also explain why we observe no out-group bias from any of the groups.
The paper is organized as follows. We  provide background information on Pakistan, Madrassas, and the other groups
we consider in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data, sample and experimental procedures, while Section 4 presents the
empirical results. In Section 5, we investigate the causal effect of Madrassa attendance on the behavior of Madrassa students.
We provide a discussion of our results and concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Background
2.1. Pakistan: a segmented society mired in conﬂict
With a population of 184 million and a GDP per capita of $2400 (The World Factbook, 2010), Pakistan is a populous and
rapidly growing middle income country. Since its inception from the violent partition of India in 1947, Pakistan has been in
search of a national identity.13 To this day, it continues to be segmented along various lines and mired in violent conﬂict.
The ﬁrst divide is economic: while an estimated 24% of the population live under the ofﬁcial poverty line, estimates based
on a multidimensional poverty index such as ﬁnancial poverty, illiteracy or children out of school, poor housing and physical
household assets show that 54% of Pakistanis live in a state of multiple deprivations (Jamal, 2009). The second divide is
religious. Ninety-ﬁve percent of the population is Muslim (Sunni 75%, Shia 20%) while the remaining 5% includes Christian
and Hindu (The World Factbook, 2010). Moreover, there is also sectarian rivalry within Sunnis between Barelvis, who uphold
devotional practices such as elevating Muslim saints, and Deobandis, who seek to eliminate such practices (Talbot, 2009).
In addition to the segmentation highlighted above, another characteristic of today’s Pakistan is violence and terrorism.
Pakistan had 2670 terrorism-related deaths in 2009, placing it third in a worldwide rank. Terrorism-related incidents are not
conﬁned to certain troubled areas, but are widespread across the country. These attacks are attributed to a number of causes:
sectarian violence, secessionist movements, backlash effect of the Afghan war  (“Kalashnikov culture” and jihad mentality),
conﬂict with India over Kashmir, Islamist insurgent groups and forces such as the Taliban, and the society’s segmentation
(Talbot, 2009).
8 The inﬂuence of group membership on individual behavior has been widely studied in social psychology (Tajfel et al., 1971), where group identity is
induced exogenously by assigning participants to “minimal” groups, which are arbitrary labels such as blue or red group. These studies have found that
even  ad-hoc and trivial group categorizations typically lead to in-group bias and discrimination against the out-group (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Since the
introduction of identity into economic analysis by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), several economic studies have analyzed the impact of social/group identity
and  behavior.
9 A third approach is to use real social groups with random assignment, as in Goette et al. (2006, 2010). This approach is less common because of the
difﬁculty in ﬁnding real groups without selection.
10 Even when groups are induced but unequal, the literature ﬁnds that the higher status group gives and trusts more, and that the lower status group
favors the higher status group (Butler, 2008; Lei and Vesely, 2010).
11 Another major difference from the design in Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) is that we directly elicit the respondent’s expectations about the trustwor-
thiness of the match. Unless one makes the assumption that players play a social preferences equilibrium in the trust game, data on both expectations
about  trustworthiness and decision in the dictator game are needed to decompose behavior in the trust game.
12 Our paper is also related to the theory literature on social distance and social behavior (Akerlof, 1997), and stereotypes (Bordalo et al., 2014).
13 The various identities coming from religious, regional, and national belonging were articulated about a decade ago by nationalist Wali Khan when he
declared himself to have been a Pashtun for 4000 years, a Muslim for 1400 years, and a Pakistani for 40 years (Talbot, 2009).
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.2. The Madrassas in Pakistan
A unique feature of this paper is to have data from a large pool of Madrassa students in Pakistan. In recent years, and
n particular after 9/11, claims made by US policy makers and the popular press suggest that Madrassas – Islamic religious
chools – in Pakistan are responsible for nurturing militancy and violence. Despite popular thinking, there is considerable
ontroversy about the link between Madrassas and militancy (Billquist and Colbert, 2006; Fair, 2008).14
Madrassas admit students of all ages, and generally do not have any admission requirements. At earlier levels, students
sually learn to read and memorize the Qu’ran. The Madrassa curriculum, at advanced stages, focuses on the Dars-e-Nizami,
hich is taught for 8 years following the completion of elementary school and covers religious sciences (e.g., jurisprudence,
he Qur’an and its commentaries) and rational sciences such as Arabic grammar and literature, logic, and rhetoric (Rahman,
008).15 The materials for these subjects are texts dating to before the 14th century, and classes are typically taught in Urdu
Fair, 2006; Rahman, 2008). The majority of Madrassas do not impart any secular or vocational training, but they have rigid
urricula emphasizing rote memorization, and it has been argued, albeit with scant evidence, that they deliberately educate
heir students in narrow worldviews and rejection of Western ideas, and do not train them sufﬁciently for the real world
Ali, 2009).
An important factor in understanding the extent of Madrassas’ inﬂuence in Pakistan is how many students study in
hem. The number of Madrassas has undeniably increased, especially in the 1980s during the Soviet war  in Afghanistan,
hen Madrassas were established in Afghan refugee camps to train ﬁghters for the resistance movement (Winthrop and
raff, 2010). However, there is considerable disagreement over the extent of the penetration of Madrassas: Estimates of
adrassas’ enrollment vary from less than 1% (Andrabi et al., 2006) to 33% (International Crisis Group Report, 2002) of
ll enrolled students.16 One reason why an accurate measure of Madrassa enrollment remains challenging is that few are
egistered-according to Rashid (2000), less than a third of Madrassas are registered. Recent studies put the enrollment in
egistered Madrassas in the 1–7% range (Fair, 2008; Pakistan Ministry of Education). Regardless of the source that one choose
o favor with regard to Madrassa enrollment, the overall picture indicates that a non-trivial fraction of Pakistani youth study
n Madrassas.
A key feature of Madrassas is that they generally tend to be free. In a country with a dilapidated public educational system
Winthrop and Graff, 2010), Madrassas may  offer a viable alternative for families unable to afford more expensive private
chools (Singer, 2001).
A related important question pertains to how the Pakistani public views the linkage between Madrassas and militancy.
ecause this is relevant to the context of our study, Appendix A1 discusses the responses to some survey questions admin-
stered to the one Islamic University and a random sample in two  Pakistani urban centers that were designed to shed light
n this. We  ﬁnd suggestive evidence of the general public viewing Madrassas as playing a large role in educating the youth
nd as being somewhat complicit in militancy and extremism. We  also ﬁnd high levels of support for the government’s plan
o reform Madrassas that would require them to include secular subjects in the curriculum.
.3. Group identity
We  seek to investigate how Madrassa students and other groups of Pakistani youth interact with each other. We  focus on
roups that vary in socioeconomic characteristics, religiosity, exposure to Western ideas, and type of education they receive.
In our set-up, the “group” is the undergraduate institution where the students study. Our focus is therefore on a highly
ducated segment of the Pakistani population. Overall, in 2008/2009, 8.3% of the males aged 21 and above had attained
t least a Bachelor degree in Pakistan. The rate increases to 14.8% among those currently working in an urban area.17 The
roups we consider are endogenous because families and individuals self-select into schools. We  consider three main groups:
adrassas, Islamic Universities, and Liberal Universities.
Madrassas and their curricula have been discussed above: students typically come from modest origins, have limited
xposure to Western ideas in school, study in Urdu and base their studies on religious texts. Advanced study within the
adrassas produces an Alim (Islamic scholar and/or teacher). Most students who  graduate from a Madrassa go on to work
n the religious sector.
Islamic Universities provide a Liberal Arts curriculum combined with Islamic teachings and courses. For example, Eco-omics is taught with a focus on Islamic principles of ﬁnance. These universities have segregated campuses for males and
emales, and classes are taught in Arabic or English. These institutions tend to be public and, therefore, are accessible to low
nd middle income groups. While they have certain admission requirements, they are relatively easier to get accepted into
14 According to Winthrop and Graff (2010), while some Madrassas are linked to sectarian militancy, most are non-extremist. Asal et al. (2008) conducted
urveys of Pakistani families who had lost a son to militancy in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and concluded that there is no evidence that Madrassas are a
rinciple place for militants’ recruitment.
15 This certiﬁcation is recognized to be equivalent to a Bachelors or Masters degree by the Ministry of Education.
16 The large estimate of 33% may  be attributed to a mistake in the total number of students enrolled in Pakistan (Fair, 2006).
17 Source: Authors’ computation from the 2008/2009 Pakistan Labor Force Survey.
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(relative to liberal universities). A relatively large proportion of students at such universities have typically studied for some
time at Madrassas before enrolling.
Liberal Universities – the third kind of institution – are similar to American colleges. They teach a Liberal Arts curriculum
in English, and have gender-mixed campuses. Since tuition at such institutions tends to be very expensive, they are generally
accessible only to individuals from high socioeconomic backgrounds. In addition, these institutions are quite selective and
their entry requirements are such that they primarily accept students who graduate from private high schools (which tend
to have higher academic standards and which, in most cases, cater to the rich).
These three groups clearly represent three different identities within the Pakistani society. At one end of the spectrum
we have young males from poorer backgrounds who  attend religious schools that are thought by many outside of (and to
some extent inside of) Pakistan to be linked to militancy and extremism. At the other end of the spectrum we have wealthy
students exposed to Western-type education. Our measure of group identity is a measure of both religious identity as well
as social class. In this paper, we use the term “identity” for “group afﬁliation.”
3. Data
We  conducted experiments in two male Sunni Madrassas from the Barelvi school of thought, two  male Sunni Madrassas
from the Deobandi school of thought, one Islamic University (IU), and two liberal Universities, all located in Islam-
abad/Rawalpindi and Lahore between May  and October 2010. The Islamabad/Rawalpindi metropolitan area is the third
largest in the country with a population of about 4.5 million. Islamabad, the country’s current capital, was  constructed in
1960 adjacent to Rawalpindi, an older city which houses the army’s headquarters. Lahore is the capital of the Punjab province
and the country’s second largest city with about 10 million inhabitants. While both are vibrant urban centers, the Islam-
abad/Rawalpindi metropolitan area is located closer to Afghanistan and the tribal areas, and has greater ethnic diversity
compared to Lahore. However, Punjabis are the dominant ethnic group in both metropolitan areas. We  focus on two  cities
for practical reasons for the data collection.
We targeted the largest institutions in each category in each city. Data collection was conducted by the Survey Center
(SC) afﬁliated with the Islamic University.18 The SC Team approached the schools for consent, and informed them that the
study dealt with decision-making and opinions/expectations of Pakistani youth. Furthermore, they notiﬁed the schools that
the study was being conducted on behalf of an international research organization. A copy of the questionnaire was provided
to the contact person of each institution for vetting (however, the contact person could not keep a copy of the questionnaire
with them).
The institutions in our sample are among the ﬁve largest and best-regarded institutions in the relevant category in that
city. Among all the institutions we contacted, one Liberal University and one Madrassa declined participation. We  sampled the
most senior students in the four Madrassas since they are similar in age to university students, and are pursuing the Madrassa
equivalent of a Bachelor degree. Though participation was  voluntary, almost everyone in the Madrassas participated in the
study. At the other institutions, a random sample of students was  selected to participate based on a listing of students
provided by the registrar’s ofﬁce. Average response rate at the universities was about 70%. Data collection took 1–2 days in
the Madrassas, and about a week at the other institutions. To signal credibility of the study to the students, members of the
staff of the institution at which data was being collected were also hired for the data collection. Overall 1521 male students
participated in the experiments.19 They also answered a questionnaire asking about demographic characteristics, school
choice, and attitudes on social issues. Below we describe our sample and the experimental procedure.
3.1. Sample
Table 1 compares the characteristics of the male participants by group (educational afﬁliation), and compares them to
the characteristics of a random sample of male respondents from Islamabad/Rawalpindi and Lahore (City sample) obtained
from a separate survey we conducted in 2010. On average, student age varies between 20 and 22. Since we  ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
differences among the Madrassas in terms of either their demographic characteristics or their experimental behavior, we
combine the four Madrassas into one group to keep the tables and analysis simple (the disaggregated statistics are available
from the authors upon request). However, because they differ in their students’ characteristics and tuition level (as we  show
below), we classify the two Liberal Universities (LU) into two separate groups: a Liberal Western-style university (LU-W) and
a Liberal modern (LU-M) University. LU-W is more selective and liberal than the LU-M, and it caters to a higher socioeconomic
segment of the society.
18 Besides having ample experience in conducting surveys, another main reason for hiring the IU Survey Center for the data collection was  that they were
well-connected to both the secular and religious institutions in the two  cities. We believe this helped us in obtaining consent from the different types of
schools for the data collection.
19 Female students from the Islamic and Liberal Universities also participated in the experiments. We restrict the analysis in this paper to male students
who  were matched with other male students in order to focus on group identity, deﬁned by socioeconomic class and religiosity (proxied by institution).
The  full sample (before excluding female students from IU and LU, and male students from all institutions matched with female students) consists of 2836
students. The Madrassas we surveyed cater to male students only. Female Madrassas tend to be small. Since large sample sizes are needed for randomization
in  the experiment, we  did not include them in our sample.
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Table  1
Summary characteristics.
LU-W LU-M IU Madr City F-test
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of observations 168 287 270 796 394
Age  20.37*** 21.68** 21.75** 22.16 33.74*** 0.000
(2.66) (2.25) (2.36) (3.04) (13.22)
Father’s years of education 14*** 11*** 11*** 7.1 7.7* 0.000
(1.6) (6.1) (4.3) (5) (5.4)
Mother’s years of education 13*** 11*** 7.1*** 3.5 4* 0.000
(2.8) (4.8) (5.1) (4.3) (4.9)
Parents’ monthly income (in 1000s Rs) 192*** 99*** 42*** 21 25 0.000
(235) (146) (53) (70) (24)
Number of siblings (including self) 2.7 3.9+++ 4.7+++ n/a 5.1+++ 0.000
(1.4) (2.1) (2.4) (3)
%  Father attended Madrassaa 4*** 14** 13*** 21 1*** 0.000
%  Mother attended Madrassa 5 13++ 7 n/a 1+++ 0.000
%  Friend attended Madrassa 5 22+++ 23+++ n/a 1+++ 0.000
%  Sibling attended Madrassa 7 23+++ 26+++ n/a 2+++ 0.000
%  Parents own:
Home 92*** 86* 84 82 100*** 0.000
Tv  91*** 84*** 77*** 30 84*** 0.000
Cellphone 90*** 79*** 80*** 72 97*** 0.000
Computer 83*** 69*** 60*** 25 70*** 0.000
Internet access 77*** 50*** 40*** 8 45*** 0.000
Motorbike 47*** 65*** 50*** 32 61*** 0.000
Car  84*** 68*** 43*** 11 37*** 0.000
Religiosity (0–10)b 5.3*** 5.9*** 6.3*** 9.2 6.1*** 0.000
(1.7) (2) (1.6) (1.6) (2.4)
Number of times pray each day 1.5*** 2.2*** 2.9*** 4.9 2.9*** 0.000
(1.6) (1.6) (1.6) (.41) (1.9)
%  Fast during Ramadan 89*** 92*** 96*** 98 89*** 0.000
(.24) (.2) (.14) (.13) (.24)
Trust  (0–10)c 4.3*** 4.8 4.5** 5.1 n/a 0.003
(2)  (2.6) (2.8) (3.4)
Risk  general (0–10)d 6.7*** 6.9*** 6.5*** 5.3 n/a 0.000
(2)  (2.4) (2.4) (4)
%  Watch English-language news 86*** 83*** 82*** 24 24 0.000
%  Watch BBC or CNN 62*** 60*** 58*** 23 12*** 0.000
%  Know victim of violent attack 14 16 34+++ n/a 14 0.000
LU-W is the most selective school, Liberal Western-style University; LU-M is the Liberal Modern University; IU is Islamic University; Madr is Madrassa;
City  refers to a random sample of the populations in the two cities.
This table shows pairwise t-tests for each institution group characteristics versus those of Madrassa. * Signiﬁcant at p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
For  those characteristics not available for Madrassa students, pairwise t-tests are shown versus those of LU-W. Signiﬁcant at +p < 0.10, ++ p < 0.05, +++ p < 0.01.
a Percent of respondents whose father attended a Madrassa or any religious institution for more than 2 years (either part time or full time).
a
t
c
i
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s
t
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ib Self-reported religiosity on a scale of zero (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).
c Response to question: “most people can be trusted?” on a scale of zero (all people cannot be trusted) to 10 (all people can be trusted).
d Self-reported risk preference on a scale of zero (totally unwilling to take risk) to 10 (fully prepared to take risks).
Table 1 shows observed differences among respondents from the four groups, ranked by most-to-least liberal institutional
fﬁliation. Students at more liberal schools have parents with higher income, education, and asset ownership. For example,
he average number of years of father’s (mother’s) schooling is 14 (13) for students from the Liberal Western-style University
ompared to 7.1 (3.5) years in the Madrassas. Similarly, the monthly parental income in the liberal Western-style University
s nearly 10 times the income in the Madrassas. Moreover, the characteristics of students at LU-W and LU-M, the two  Liberal
niversities, are signiﬁcantly different from each other in most cases. For example, average parental income for LU-W
tudents is almost twice that of LU-M students.
Self-reported religiosity and the number of prayers per day also vary by group. Students were asked to rate how religious
hey considered themselves to be on a scale from 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious). The average religiosity is 5.3
n the liberal Western-style University compared to 9.2 in the Madrassas. The former also pray much less frequently every
ay (1.5 as compared with 4.9 times per day). Students were also asked about their risk attitudes on a 0–10 scale (with zero
eing totally unwilling to take risk)20; the average Madrassa student is less willing to take risks (5.3) than Liberal University
tudents.
Finally, students differ in their exposure to information and media, as well as in peer group characteristics. Just 23% of the
adrassa students report watching BBC and CNN, compared with 60% of the students of the other groups. In addition, while
20 Dohmen et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the risk tolerance self-reported on this qualitative scale is consistent with the risk preference elicited with a ﬁnancially
ncentivized lottery-type experiment developed by Holt and Laury (2002). Other studies using this measure of risk attitude include Caliendo et al. (2010).
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fathers of only 4% of students attending LU-W spent more than two  years studying in a Madrassa either on a part-time or
full-time basis, the corresponding proportion for Madrassa students is 21%. Similarly, about 6% of the LU-W students have
at least a sibling or a friend who spent more than two years in a Madrassa either part- or full-time, compared with nearly
a quarter of students at LU-M and IU.21 This also suggests that the various groups in our setting do interact with and have
exposure to each other at some level.
Institutional sorting based on socioeconomic and other characteristics is stark but unsurprising given Pakistan’s divided
history. As we move from left-most LU-W (column 1) toward Madrassas (column 4) in Table 1, the average socioeconomic
characteristics deteriorate (for example, parental income and education decrease). At the same time, extent of religiosity
increases. If we compare the students to the City sample (column 5), we  see that Madrassa students seem to hail from
humbler backgrounds than do those from the general population in the cities, and that all other institutions fare better in
terms of most indicators of wealth. This is consistent with the hypothesis mentioned above that poverty may  drive families
to send their children to Madrassas.
The last row of the table also shows that a non-trivial proportion of respondents (14– 34%) in each setting have an
acquaintance who died or was injured as a result of the violence in Pakistan. This shows again, as pointed out in Section 2.1,
that violence is widespread and has affected a large proportion of the general public.
3.2. Design of experimental games
We  now present the details of the experimental games that we run to understand how the groups interact with each
other.
Procedure: The experiments were conducted in sessions of 50–100 students in a classroom of the student’s institution.
The rooms were large enough to ensure respondent anonymity. The instructions were given to each participant, read out
aloud by the experimenters and projected on a retro-projector.22 Respondents played the games on a paper questionnaire
and were matched with an actual partner ex-post, so they did not learn the actual identity or action of their partner while
playing the game. The questionnaire was administered in Urdu at all places except the Western-style liberal University
where it was conducted in English, since students there are more used to reading and writing in English.23 Moreover, the
questionnaires were identical across all the institutions up to the section leading into the experiments.
Games: Students were asked to play the following games:
- Trust game: Player A (the sender) is given a ﬁxed amount of money (Rs. 300) and decides whether to keep it or give it to
Player B (the receiver), i.e. to invest it. If given to Player B, the experimenter triples that amount and gives it to Player B
who is asked to choose whether to transfer any money back to player A (which can be any amount between zero and Rs.
900). This is a binary version of the “trust game” introduced by Berg et al. (1995) – it is binary in the sense that player A
can choose to send either nothing or the entire amount. The efﬁcient outcome is for A to invest the money by transferring
it to player B, while the subgame perfect equilibrium is to keep the money. Lack of trust toward the partner may lead to
inefﬁciencies. In our setting, all respondents ﬁrst played the role of Player A and then the role of a Player B, who  received
the money. When put in the role of Player B, we use the strategy method and ask the respondent to report the amount he
would like to send back conditional on Player A deciding to invest.
- Dictator game: This is a one-stage game in which Player A (the sender) divides a ﬁxed amount of money (Rs. 400) between
himself and Player B (the receiver). Player B does not make any decision. Again, respondents play ﬁrst in the role of Player
A and then in the role of Player B (in which case there is no decision to make).
- Expectations: For both the trust and dictator games, respondents were asked to guess (i) the average amount that students
from their own institution chose to give to their partners, and (ii) vice versa, the average amount that students from the
partner’s institution chose to give to their match in the respondent’s institution.24 Note that when students are asked
to provide their expectations, they are asked about the average payoffs for an identical pair of partners (see the exact
instructions in Appendix A2).Treatment: The treatment in this experiment is the randomization of institution of the pair of players.25 Each student
was randomly matched with only one of the following partners: a male Madrassa student, a male student from a Liberal
University, or a male student from an Islamic University. Students from the Liberal Modern (Western-style respectively)
21 Because of sensitivity concerns, the set of background questions asked in Madrassas was  a subset of that asked at other institutions. This information
was  collected after the experiments had been completed.
22 Full instructions are presented in the online Appendix A2.
23 The translation was  supervised by Basit Zafar (co-author) who  speaks both English and Urdu ﬂuently, to ensure that nothing was  lost in translation.
24 While we want to measure the respondent’s expectation of the amount his partner sends back, we  ask the respondent to guess the average amount sent
back  by all students from the partner’s institution (who are matched with students in the respondent’s institution). This is because, asking the respondent
for  his expectation of the amount sent back by his partner, may  prompt the respondent to report expectations that rationalize his own investment decision
in  the trust game. We  believe our approach mitigates this concern of ex-post rationalization, and is hence superior.
25 We also randomized the gender of the partner. We focus here on pairings of male subjects. We discuss results by gender in Delavande and Zafar (2014).
However, each student is only paired with a partner of one gender.
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Table  2
Number of respondents by match.
Institution Matched with:
LUa IU Madrassa Total
LU-W 58 51 59 168
LU-M 95 90 102 287
IU  89 86 95 270
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Total  478 425 618 1521
a LU-M were matched with LU-M. All other institutions were matched with LU-W.
niversity who were selected to be matched with a student from a Liberal University were informed that they were matched
ith a student from their own university. All other students who were selected to be matched with a student from a Liberal
niversity were informed that they were matched with a student from the Liberal Western-style University. The description
f the match (with the exact name of the match’s educational institution) was  already printed on the paper questionnaire
eceived by each participant, so students were not aware that other participants in their session were possibly matched
ith partners of different educational institutions. Each student was informed that they would play all the games with the
ame partner. Students were given a short description of the institution they were matched with but since the selected
nstitutions are among the most well-known institutions, most students would have some prior knowledge of them. In
erms of implementation, the pairing was carried out with replacement (i.e., multiple students could have been matched
ith the same partner), and the match was one-way, i.e., the partner with whom the student was matched may  or may
ot have been matched with the same student. Table 2 presents the sample sizes for each institution, and for the various
atches.26 Because we use a one-way match, the sum in a given row does not match the sum in the corresponding column;
or example, while there are a total of 270 IU students in our sample, 425 students were matched with an IU student.
Payoffs: Respondents received ﬁnancial compensation for their participation in the survey and the games. Each received
 show-up fee of Rs. 200 given on the day of the session. Some tasks were then randomly chosen for determining the
dditional payoffs. One of the four roles (sender or receiver in the trust game, sender or receiver in the dictator game) was
andomly selected for compensation, along with one of the four expectations questions (Rs. 50 if the respondent correctly
dentiﬁed the interval where the actual average lies). Before making their decisions, students were (repeatedly) informed
hat they would receive compensation for only one of the four roles, chosen at random.27 This ensures that respondents treat
ach task independently, and do not hedge in their choices across tasks. Once the sessions were completed, we  randomly
atched students with a particular male partner from the institution indicated in their questionnaire and determined the
ayoffs. Starting about one week after the completion of the experiment, subjects could pick up their compensation in
ealed envelopes. Respondents earned an average of Rs. 600 from the games. The overall average compensation of Rs. 800
orresponds to about USD 10. The 2009 per capita GNI at purchasing power parity in Pakistan was $2710, compared to
46,730 in the US. This means the average compensation of USD 10 corresponds to 0.4% of the GNI per capita. The US
quivalent would be approximately USD 170. Therefore, the stakes involved in the experiments were substantial.
. Experimental results
We  now discuss the results of our experiments. We  postpone the discussion on the mechanisms behind the results to
ater sections. To better understand interactions between the different groups, we address ﬁve main questions.
Question 1: Does investment behavior in the trust game vary by group (i.e., institution type)?
We begin by investigating whether investment behavior varies systematically by group. The ﬁrst column of Table 3
hows the overall proportion of senders who chose to send the Rs. 300 in the trust game. A few notable patterns stand
ut. First, respondents are quite trusting on average, with 74.6% of students sending the Rs. 300. This is in the higher range
f what respondents have been found to send in the few studies that use a version of the binary trust game, where the
nvestment rate varies from 32% (Bohnet and Huck, 2004) to 91% (Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2004).28 Second, there is
eterogeneity of investment behavior by group, with Madrassa students being most likely to invest. For example, 80% of
26 Students at Madrassas who were assigned a “Male Madrassa treatment” were matched either with a student at their own Madrassa, or a different
adrassa but one that belonged to the same school of thought, i.e., Barelvi (Deobandi) Madrassa students were only matched with students at another
arelvi  (Deobandi) Madrassa. Because we do not ﬁnd any systematic differences between the two in our analysis, the two  groups are combined in the main
ables  (we  discuss the differences between the two  Madrassas in a later section). Since it combines two  treatments, more Madrassa students are matched
ith  Madrassa students than with LU and IU students in Table 2.
27 Upon completion of the experiments and survey, a 4-sided dice was  rolled for each student and they were informed about the task they would receive
ompensation for.
28 One needs to be cautious in making any comparisons with the few studies that employ a binary trust game, since small modiﬁcations in the design
such as stake size, stake increase in the investment game – in our case three times, speciﬁcs of the match that the respondent is informed about, sample
haracteristics) can result in large differences. The continuous trust game has been employed by more studies. Players A (trustors) send about 50% of their
ndowment in such games in developed as well as developing countries (Camerer, 2003; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008).
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Table 3
Proportion of respondents who  send money in the Trust game.
Institution Matched with p-value fora
Total LU IU Madr F-test Kruskal–Wallis
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LU-W 0.631 0.552 0.686 0.661 0.296 0.294
N  168 58 51 Median 59
LU-M  0.781 0.737 0.844*+ 0.765 0.189 0.188
N  287 95 90 102
IU  0.615 0.551 0.628 0.663 0.282 0.281
N  270 89 86 95
Madr  0.802 0.826 0.808 0.782 0.398 0.397
N  796 236 198 362
Total  0.746 0.724 0.765 0.749 0.359 0.359
N  1521 478 425 618
p-Value forb
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.039
Kruskal–Wallis 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.039
In addition, the table also conducts two sets of pairwise hypothesis tests between having a match from own institution type versus another institution type.
p-Values of these tests are not reported but their signiﬁcance is denoted by plus (+) or asterisks (*): (1) Wilcoxon rank-sum tests signiﬁcant at *p < 0.10,
**p  < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. (2) T-tests signiﬁcant at +p < 0.10, ++p < 0.05, +++p < 0.01.
a p-Values of tests for equality of means/distributions across matches within a row institution.
b p-Values of tests for equality of means/distributions across institutions.
the Madrassa students chose to send the money compared to 61% of IU students. When comparing the four groups, we can
reject equality of the means using an F-test, and the hypothesis that all samples are drawn from the same distribution using
a Kruskal–Wallis test (tests presented in the last two  rows of Table 3).29 When conducting pairwise t-tests, we ﬁnd that the
mean investment rate of the Madrassa students is statistically signiﬁcantly different from that of the other groups, except for
LU-M.
It is also of interest to evaluate whether group membership solely leads to the distinctive behavior, or whether observable
characteristics partly explain this difference. We investigate this in columns (1)–(3) of Appendix Table A2, which reports the
marginal effects of a probit regression of the decision to send money in the trust game on observables as well as institution
dummies. We  also include a variable “relative earnings of matched partner”, which is the respondent’s perceived average
earnings of a 30-year old graduate from the matched institution relative to the respondent’s average earnings of an average
graduate from their own institution.30 This variable is included to allow for the possibility that behavior in the games may
be impacted by the perceived socioeconomic background of an average person in the matched institution (which may be a
good proxy for the matched partner’s socioeconomic background). We  ﬁnd that observable characteristics, such as measures
of socioeconomic background (parental wealth, parents’ income, parents’ education), age, risk preference and self-reported
religiosity have little power in explaining the decision to invest in the trust game (column 1). Column 2 shows that attending
a Madrassa and attending LU-M is associated with a higher probability of sending money in the trust game, compared to
attending LU-W (both coefﬁcients statistically signiﬁcant at 1%, and not statistically different from each other). Moreover, the
coefﬁcient on the Madrassa and LU-M dummies stays statistically signiﬁcant even after controlling for observables (column
3), suggesting that sorting on observables into these institutions cannot explain the differential behavior across groups.31
We  summarize these results below:
Result 1. Investment behavior in the trust game varies by group, with Madrassa and LU-M students being more likely to
invest. Differences in observable characteristics do not explain the differential behavior across groups.
Question 2 Do students exhibit in-group bias and is there differential treatment (discrimination) in terms of investment against
a particular group?As pointed out earlier, a large body of literature suggests that individuals tend to favor members of their own group,
though other work ﬁnds that there is out-group favoritism from lower status groups when groups are unequal. We  now
investigate whether there is in-group or out-group bias, or systematic discrimination in favor of or against a particular group
29 Note that this result is not driven by the larger sample size of pairs of Madrassa students matched with other Madrassa students as we obtain similar
results  if we  look at the investment behavior for a given partner. For example, among subjects matched with students from the IU, we see that 63% (80%)
of  the IU (Madrassa) students decided to invest. We discuss these results below.
30 Respondents were asked the following question: “Consider a typical male student who graduates from each of the institutions listed in column 1 below and
who  is working at age 30. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to him. How much do you think he could earn per MONTH on AVERAGE at the age of
30  at these jobs?”
31 Columns (2)-(3) of Appendix Table A2 also include a Barelvi dummy  (that equals 1 if the student is enrolled in a Barelvi Madrassa) interacted with a
Madrassa dummy. Since the speciﬁcation includes a Madrassa dummy, the coefﬁcient on this interaction shows the average additive effect of being enrolled
in  a Barelvi Madrassa relative to a Deobandi Madrassa. We  see that the estimate is statistically and economically not different from zero, indicating that
Doebandi and Barelvi Madrassa students exhibit similar behavior in the trust game.
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n our data. For each group, Columns (2)–(4) of Table 3 show the proportion of respondents who sent the Rs. 300 in the trust
ame conditional on the group they are matched with. Within each group (i.e., each row institution), we  do not reject the
ypothesis that the proportion of respondents who  invest does not vary by the matched group (as indicated by the F-test
or equality of proportions within group, and Kruskal–Wallis that tests whether the data come from the same distribution
n columns 5 and 6, respectively). This suggests that there is no systematic discrimination against a particular group in any
roup’s investment decision. In addition, we conduct two  sets of pairwise hypothesis tests between having a match from
ne’s own institution type versus another institution type (Wilcoxon rank-sum, and t-test). The table does not report the
-values for these tests, but simply denotes their signiﬁcance either with an asterisk or a plus symbol. We  see that none of
he pairwise tests are statistically signiﬁcant at levels of signiﬁcance of 10% or lower (with the exception of the amount sent
y LU-M students to IU students versus students at their own  institution). This indicates that students do not invest more
xtensively when interacting with a partner from their own  group.32
One potential issue in interpreting this null result is whether there is enough statistical power to ﬁnd a statistically
igniﬁcant effect. This may  be more of a concern for LU-W, LU-M and IU where the sample sizes are smaller than for the
adrassas. The relative magnitudes in Table 3, however, always show that students do not favor their own  group: the
roportion of students who send money in the trust game to members of their own group is never higher than that of
tudents matched with other institutions. For example, while on average, 63% of the LU-W students invest in the trust game,
nly 55% of those matched with LU do so. Looking at the relative magnitude of the proportions, there is also no evidence
hat Madrassas students are treated differently than the other groups. As an additional check, we  group LU-W, LU-M and
U and test the hypothesis that the proportion of students who invest in the trust game is the same depending on whether
hey were matched with a Madrassa student or a student from this new aggregated group. Using a t-test, we  do not reject
his hypothesis (p-value = 0.417).
We  summarize this result below:
esult 2. There is no evidence of in-group bias or of differential treatment to any particular group in the trust game.
When playing the trust game, there are several dimensions of preferences and beliefs that may  motivate a subject to
invest”, i.e., to send money to the matched partner:
(i) unconditional other-regarding preferences such as altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990),
inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or maximin preferences (Charness and Rabin,
2002),
(ii) beliefs about trustworthiness of the partner (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000; Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006), and
iii) risk preferences (Karlan, 2005; Schechter, 2007).
Results from the trust game do not allow identiﬁcation of the relative roles of those dimensions (Cox, 2004). While Result
 emphasizes a homogenous investment behavior toward the various groups, such a result could still be consistent with
ifferent levels of trust and of unconditional other-regarding behavior toward certain groups.33 For example, Madrassa
tudents may  invest similarly in IU students and Liberal University students because they do not trust IU students but are
ltruistic toward them while they trust Liberal University students but do not exhibit altruism toward them.
Our multiple-game experimental design allows us to separately measure unconditional other-regarding behavior and
xpected trustworthiness. In the dictator game, the only motive for sending money to the partner is unconditional other-
egarding behavior.34 We  can thus learn more about other-regarding behavior by analyzing how students played that game.
n addition, the elicitation of expected average amount sent back by each group to students from their own  institution gives
s a measure of expected trustworthiness or stereotype toward each group. This is developed in the two  following questions.
Question 3: Is there taste-based discrimination against a group?
Table 4 shows the average amount sent in the dictator game for all pairs of partners. As shown in the ﬁrst column in the
ast panel, on average, students sent Rs. 171 (42.7% of the total amount) to their partner and only 6.7% did not send anything at
ll. This is a very high level of unconditional other-regarding behavior when compared to the standard of dictators typically
ending between 20% and 30% of their endowment in both developed as well as developing countries (Camerer, 2003;
ardenas and Carpenter, 2008). There is however substantial heterogeneity in respondents’ behavior, as indicated by a large
tandard deviation of Rs. 77.
32 These results also hold if we control for respondents’ observables in within-institution regressions with match dummies.
33 Since students were randomly assigned a treatment (i.e., match type), differences in risk preferences cannot explain any of the results since there is
o  reason to believe that risk preferences would change by match type. Therefore, we  do not focus on this explanation when decomposing behavior in
he  trust game. However, we do have qualitative measures of risk preferences from the respondents, and they in fact are similar within each treatment
onditional on the student’s institution.
34 We follow the broad experimental literature in interpreting differences in dictator game behavior as a measure of taste-based discrimination (e.g.,
ershtman and Gneezy, 2001; List, 2004) though we acknowledge that other motives are possible. Note also that the dictator game has been found to be
ensitive to framing effect (e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2008). While framing is likely to affect the level of behavior in these games, it is unlikely to affect
etween-subject differences.
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Table 4
Amount sent in the dictator game.
Institution Matched with P-value for
Total LU IU Madr F-testb Median testd Kruskal-Wallisf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LU-W
Mean 161 141 179** 166 0.044 0.153 0.108
Median 200 200 200** 200
Std dev 83.4 82.4 88.2 76.8
N  168 58 51 59
%  Who  did not send 10.7 15.5 5.9 10.2 0.268 0.264 0.266
LU-M
Mean  168 158 181** 167 0.125 0.148 0.368
Median 200 200 200 200
Std dev 78.6 73.1 72.8 87.0*
N 287 95 90 102
%  Who  did not send 7.3 8.4 4.4 8.8 0.450 0.448 0.449
IU
Mean  144 142 135 155 0.280 0.351 0.446
Median 200 200 185 200
Std dev 82.2 86.7 82.1 77.5
N  269 88 86 95
%  Who  did not send 13.8 15.9 16.3 9.5 0.323 0.321 0.322
Madrassa
Mean  183 187* 189** 177 0.074 0.075 0.040
Median 200 200** 200** 200
Std dev 70.6 69.1 74.7 69.0
N  790 233 198 359
%  Who  did not send 3.2 3.8 3.0 2.8 0.760 0.759 0.759
Total
Mean  171 167 176 171
Median 200 200 200 200
Std dev 77.1 77.7 80.0 74.6
N  1514 474 425 615
%  Who  did not send 6.7 8.4 6.4 5.5
P-value for
F-testa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059
Median testc 0.023 0.014 0.015 0.850
Kruskal–Wallis teste 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022
In addition, this table also conducts four sets of pairwise hypothesis tests between having a match from own  institution type versus another institution
type  for amount sent. P-values of these tests are NOT reported but their signiﬁcance is denoted by stars (*). Signiﬁcance of (1) t-test is reported on the
means. (2) Wilcoxon rank-sum test is reported on the medians, (3) Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is reported on the sample sizes, and (4) F-test for equality of
standard deviations, reported on the std dev. For all four, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
a F-test for the equality of means for a given match across institutions (column).
b F-test for the equality of means across matches within an institution group (row).
c Nonparametric median test for the equality of medians across institutions for a given match.
d Nonparametric median test for the equality of medians across matches within an institution.
e Kruskal–Wallis test for the equality of distributions across institutions for a given match.
f Kruskal–Wallis test for the equality of distributions within an institution by match.
Looking at the other panels of the table, what stands out is that the average amount sent in the dictator game to students
in one’s own school is always lower than that sent to students in any of the out-groups, though the differences are not
statistically signiﬁcant in most cases (as indicated by the p-values reported in the last three columns of the table). We  see
that within Liberal Universities and Madrassas, there is some evidence that students tend actually to give less to their own
group compared to IU students (as indicated by the pairwise t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, denoted by stars on the
mean and median, respectively; the table does not report those p-values).35 Another difference in behavior is noticeable:
Madrassa students give on average more than any other group and are less likely to give nothing. We  also investigate the
predictive power of observable characteristics at explaining the amount sent in the dictator game in columns (4)–(6) of
Appendix Table A2. Again, we ﬁnd that the higher unconditional other-regarding behavior of Madrassa students (and lower
35 However, for all groups, we do not reject equality of distribution based on the pairwise Kolmogorov–Smirnov test when comparing own group versus
other  groups (as indicated by the absence of any stars that denote signiﬁcance on the sample sizes).
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Table  5
Amount expected back from match out of Rs. 900.
Institution Matched with: P-value for:
Total LU IU Madr F-test Median test Kruskal–Wallis
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LU-W
Mean 350.6 336.2 406.9** 316.1 0.011 0.003 0.012
Median 350.0 350.0 450.0** 350.0
Std  dev 165.1 156.1 185.8 143.4
Prop. expect >200 0.845 0.828 0.902 0.814 0.402 0.400
Prop.  expect >300 0.607 0.586 0.725 0.525 0.094 0.094
Prop.  expect >400 0.375 0.362 0.549 0.237 0.003 0.003
N  168 58 51 59
LU-M
Mean 370.91 379.5 376.7 357.8 0.455 0.884 0.556
Median 350.00 350.0 350.0 350.0
Std  dev 131.62 132.0 131.4 131.8
Prop. expect >200 0.913 0.937 0.900 0.902 0.601 0.600
Prop.  expect >300 0.746 0.789 0.756 0.696 0.314 0.313
Prop.  expect >400 0.470 0.484 0.478 0.451 0.885 0.884
N  287 95 90 102
IU
Mean 357.78 333.2** 379.1 361.6 0.095 0.099 0.082
Median 350.00 350.0** 350.0 450.0
Std  dev 141.60 158.3 138.8 124.5
Prop. expect >200 0.878 0.787 0.930 0.916 0.005 0.006
Prop.  expect >300 0.700 0.640 0.756 0.705 0.250 0.249
Prop.  expect >400 0.452 0.360 0.488 0.505 0.100 0.100
N  270 89 86 95
Madrassa
Mean 405.8 404.1 405.9 406.8 0.975 0.566 0.875
Median 450.0 450.0 450.0 450.0
Std  dev 145.9 153.1 145.4 141.8
Prop. expect >200 0.918 0.919 0.919 0.917 0.993 0.994
Prop.  expect >300 0.779 0.750 0.783 0.796 0.418 0.418
Prop.  expect >400 0.612 0.623 0.591 0.616 0.774 0.774
N  787 233 195 359
P-value for:
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.283 0.000
Median test 0.000 0.007 0.070 0.002
Kruskal–Wallis test 0.000 0.000 0.161 0.000
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dhis table conducts three sets of pairwise hypothesis tests of equality of amount expected from a match from own institution type versus match from
nother institution type. P-values of these tests are NOT reported but their signiﬁcance is denoted by stars (*). Signiﬁcance of (1) t-test is reported on the
eans. (2) Wilcoxon rank-sum test is reported on the medians, (3) Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is reported on the sample sizes, and (4) F-test for equality of
tandard deviations, reported on the std dev. For all four, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
ther-regarding behavior of IU students) is not entirely explained by differences in observable characteristics.36 We do,
owever, ﬁnd evidence of Barelvi Madrassa students being more altruistic than Deobandi Madrassa students.37
We  summarize this in the following result:
esult 3. Within each group (institution type), there is no negative taste-based discrimination against any out-group. On
he contrary, LU and Madrassa students tend to give more to the out-group than to their own group. Madrassa students also
xhibit stronger unconditional other-regarding behavior than any other group.Question 4: Is there systematic difference in expected trustworthiness (stereotype) for a particular group?
Table 5 shows the expectations reported by individuals regarding the average amount expected back from the matched
roup, i.e., it reveals expected trustworthiness (or stereotype). Note that respondents choose an interval for the average and
36 Note that we cannot disentangle the exact mechanisms leading to each group’s unconditional other-regarding behavior. As mentioned above, uncon-
itional other-regarding behavior may  be prompted by altruism, warm glow, inequity-aversion, or maximin preferences. For example, it could be that an
verage LU student has distaste (low altruism) toward Madrassa students (relative to tastes toward students at other institutions), but is very averse to
ncome inequality. This could lead to similar average behavior in the dictator game toward different groups since Madrassa students tend to be from less
fﬂuent backgrounds; our “relative earnings of matched partner” variable should partly control for this, though.
37 The Madrassa dummy estimate is statistically different from the estimate on all other schools in column (5) based on F-tests. Upon inclusion of
bservables in column (6), we cannot reject that the Madrassa dummy  is statistically different from the LU-M dummy estimate. It, however, continues
o  be the case that Barelvi Madrassa students’ average behavior (the sum of the coefﬁcients on the Madrassa dummy and the Barelvi interaction term) is
ifferent from that of all other non-Madrassa students.
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do not report a point estimate for the exact average. The mean, median and standard deviation amounts presented in Table 5
are those obtained by allocating the middle of the chosen interval as expected average. To conduct hypothesis testing on
various quantiles of the distribution of expectations, we  also present in Table 5 the proportion of respondents who  expect
to receive more than Rs. 200, more than Rs. 300, and more than Rs. 400 from the match.
Three points from this table are of note. First, Madrassa students most expect other groups to be trustworthy. Column (1)
of Table 5 shows that Madrassa students expect back Rs. 406 on average while all other institutions expect less than Rs. 370,
with the differences being statistically signiﬁcant (see test for equality of means, medians, and distributions of the four groups
presented at the bottom of Table 5).38 LU-M students’ average is the second highest across all the institutions. In Table 4,
we saw that the same two groups – Madrassa and LU-M students – also exhibit the strongest other-regarding behavior. This
may imply that trusting behavior is related to both unconditional other-regarding behavior as well as expectations of return.
We return to this point in Section 6.
Second, students from LU-M and Madrassas expect all groups to be equally trustworthy (none of the p-values of the tests
for equality of means, medians and distributions of the three matches presented in the last three columns of Table 5 are
less than 5%). Finally, students from LU-W and IU expect different levels of trustworthiness across the various groups. LU-W
students believe IU students to be the most trustworthy and Madrassa students to be the least trustworthy. For example,
more than half of the LU-W students expect IU students to send back more than Rs. 400 compared to less than a quarter who
expect Madrassa students to send more than Rs. 400. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant as shown on the test based
on the imputed expectations and on the proportion of respondents who expect to receive more than Rs. 400 (p-value less
than 10% in the last three columns of Table 5).39 In contrast, IU students expect Liberal University students to be the least
trustworthy.
Columns (7)–(9) of Appendix Table A2 show that differences in observable characteristics cannot explain the high trust-
worthiness of Madrassa students, particularly Deobandi Madrassa students.40 We  summarize the results from Table 5 as
follows:
Result 4. There is no systematic difference about perceived trustworthiness of other groups for LU-M and Madrassa stu-
dents. Compared to other groups, Madrassa students most expect others to be trustworthy. LU-W students expect Madrassa
students to be the least trustworthy.
Question 5: Are the stereotypes correct?
We  now compare the expected amount sent to the actual amount sent in Table 6. We  show the proportion of students
who expected more than Rs. 300 from a given group and the proportion of students from that group who actually sent more
than Rs. 300. In addition, we also show the proportion of students who had “accurate” expectations (i.e., chose the interval
that contained the actual average), and the proportion of students who  under-estimated the amount sent (i.e., chose an
interval whose upper-bound was below the actual average).
Several interesting ﬁndings stand out. First, Liberal University (LU-W and LU-M) students have inaccurate expectations
about Madrassa students. While 81% of the Madrassa students sent more than Rs. 300 to Liberal University students, only
52% of LU-W and 69% of LU-M students expected to receive more than this amount of money. The differences between actual
proportions that sent and expected proportions are statistically signiﬁcant at 5% (as indicated by the p-value in the third
row of each panel in Table 6). Moreover, a large proportion of respondents from Liberal Universities under-estimated what
Madrassa students would send back (76% of the LU-W and 54% of the LU-M students). Note that this result is not driven solely
by the fact that Madrassa students actually send back the most amount relative to other groups (last row in each panel in
Table 6), but also by the fact that Liberal Universities’ students expect Madrassa students to be the least trustworthy (Table 5).
Second, Madrassa students expected more from Liberal University students than what they actually received from them:
only 13% of the Madrassa students had accurate expectations while 64% over-estimated the amount they would receive.
On the contrary, IU students tended to expect less from Liberal University students than what they actually sent (the t-test
for equality of proportion of students who expect more than Rs. 300 and the proportion who  actually sent more than Rs.
300 is statistically signiﬁcant at 10%). These differences, however, do not seem to be large enough to generate differences in
investment behavior in the trust game (see Result 2), possibly because of the binary nature of the decision.
An interesting question is whether the error in perceived trustworthiness is correlated with individuals’ characteristics.
We investigate this in Table 7, where the dependent variable is the gap in perceived trustworthiness (that is, perceived
38 The median test is a non-parametric test testing the null hypothesis that all the samples are drawn from populations with the same median. The data
in  each sample are assigned to two groups, one consisting of data whose values are higher than the median value in the two groups combined, and the
other  consisting of data whose values are at the median or below. A Pearson’s chi-square test is then used to determine whether the observed frequencies
in  each group differ from expected frequencies derived from a distribution combining the two groups. Because of this, there are instances in Table 6 where
we  reject the null hypothesis under the median test, even when the medians are identical.
39 The last three columns of Appendix Table A2 investigate the predictive power of observable characteristics at explaining the amount expected back
in  the trust game. Again, we ﬁnd that the higher expectation of Madrassa students is not entirely explained by differences in observable characteristics.
There  is also some evidence that, relative to Deobandi Madrassa students, Barelvi Madrassa students have lower expectations of the return.
40 In column (8), the Madrassa dummy  (as well as the sum of the Madrassa dummy  and Barelvi interaction term) is statistically different from the estimates
on  all non-Madrassa institutions. In column (9), the Madrassa dummy is statistically different from the estimates on the non-Madrassa institutions (but
the  Madrassa + Barelvi × Madrassa term is no longer statistically different from the LU-M dummy  estimate).
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Table  6
How do expectations compare with actual choices of trustees?
Institution Matched with P-value for:
Total LU IU Madr F-test Kruskal–Wallis
LU-W
Prop. expect >300 0.607 0.586 0.725 0.525 0.094 0.094
Prop.  match sent >300 0.709 0.621 0.584 0.814***,+++ 0.000 0.000
P-value actual v. expecteda 0.015 0.646 0.096 0.000
Prop. accurate expectation 0.185 0.224 0.176 0.153 0.603 0.600
Prop. under-estimated 0.494 0.414 0.275 0.763*** 0.000 0.000
N  168 58 51 59
Actual sent by match 411.19 365.44 347.30 465.08 0.000 0.109
LU-M
Prop.  expect >300 0.746 0.789 0.756 0.696 0.314 0.313
Prop.  match sent > 300 0.709 0.621 0.584 0.814***,+++ 0.000 0.000
p-value actual v. expecteda 0.276 0.0053 0.015 0.017
Prop. accurate expectation 0.328 0.305 0.278 0.392 0.208 0.207
Prop.  under-estimated 0.341 0.211 0.244 0.549*** 0.000 0.000
N  287 95 90 102
Actual sent by match 411.186 365.44 347.299 465.08 0.000 0.101
IU
Prop.  expect >300 0.700 0.640*+ 0.756 0.705 0.250 0.249
Prop.  match sent >300 0.753 0.745**,++ 0.756 0.758 0.962 0.962
P-value actual v. expecteda 0.124 0.092 1.000 0.341
Prop. accurate expectation 0.404 0.303*+ 0.442 0.463 0.060 0.060
Prop.  under-estimated 0.548 0.640*+ 0.512 0.495 0.100 0.100
N  270 89 86 95
Actual sent by match 428.43 409.08 410.58 449.98 0.026 0.010
Madr
Prop.  expect >300 0.779 0.750 0.783 0.796 0.418 0.418
Prop.  match sent >300 0.748 0.708 0.779 0.757 0.370 0.370
P-value actual v. expecteda 0.168 0.3551 0.9403 0.2124
Prop. accurate expectation 0.361 0.1274***,+++ 0.455 0.461 0.000 0.000
Prop.  under-estimated 0.339 0.237***,+++ 0.394 0.376 0.000 0.000
N  796 236 198 362
Actual sent by match 413.69 397.39 415.79 420.47 0.240 0.001
In addition, this table conducts two pairwise hypothesis tests on the proportions between having a match from own institution type versus another
institution type. P-values not reported but signiﬁcance of the tests is denoted:
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t1) Wilcoxon rank-sum tests signiﬁcant at *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
2)  t-Tests signiﬁcant at +p < 0.10, ++p  < 0.05, +++p < 0.01.
a t-Test for the equality of proportion that expect more than 300 and the proportion of match group that actually sent back more than 300.
verage amount sent back by matched institution’s students minus actual average amount sent back). The ﬁrst (third) column
egress the gap (absolute gap) on interactions for each of the possible pairs (the excluded pair is LU-W student matched with
 LU student). The constant term, which shows the average gap for LU-W–LU pairs, shows an average over-estimation of Rs.
69, and an average over-estimation of the absolute gap by Rs. 192. Notably, Madrassa students tend to over-estimate more
han their counterparts. Columns (2) and (4) show that inclusion of a large set of individual characteristics has little impact
n the estimates of these interaction terms. Furthermore, most of the observables, including media consumption or whether
 student ever attended a Madrassa, lack statistical signiﬁcance. We  obtain similar results when we restrict to sub-samples
e.g., Madrassa students or students matched with Madrassa students) and particular matched pairs, or when we  cut the
ample by exposure to media. This suggests that the mismatch in expectations cannot be explained by such observables.
esult 5. There is incorrect stereotyping. Liberal University students systematically under-estimate the trustworthiness of
adrassa students, while Madrassa students systematically over-estimate the trustworthiness of Liberal University students.
tereotyping is not correlated with a large set of observable characteristics.
Finally, in Appendix A3, we discuss a list of factors that could possibly inﬂuence our ﬁndings (such as whether students
isunderstood the games, and potential bias due to Hawthorne effect), and present strong pieces of evidence that suggest
hat these possible explanations are unlikely to be driving our results.
. Why  do Madrassa students behave differently?We  ﬁnd that Madrassa students behave systematically differently from other groups: they exhibit a high level of trust,
how the strongest other-regarding behavior, and have highest expectations of others’ trustworthiness. Unless there is
ositive selection into Madrassa – i.e., students enrolling in Madrassas are more trusting and pro-social to start out with
han the levels that we observe (something that is unlikely given the high levels of trust and other-regarding behavior we
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Table 7
Accuracy of expected amount sent back by trustees.
Gapa Absolute gap
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LU-W matched with IU 62.29** 60.92** 55.89** 54.54**
(27.72) (27.78) (23.37) (23.43)
LU-W  matched with Madrassa −23.65 −25.50 −28.91 −29.76
(26.70) (26.71) (22.51) (22.53)
LU-M  matched with IU 32.10 30.57 18.48 18.06
(24.31) (24.74) (20.50) (20.87)
LU-M  matched with LU 43.27* 40.60+ 32.78+ 30.81+
(24.06) (24.68) (20.29) (20.82)
LU-M  matched with Madrassa 18.09 17.70 10.75 10.74
(23.75) (24.31) (20.02) (20.50)
IU  matched with IU 34.50 29.39 21.86 16.16
(24.53) (25.65) (20.69) (21.63)
IU  matched with IU −3.06 −10.30 −0.91 −8.49
(24.37) (25.55) (20.55) (21.55)
IU  matched with Madrassa 21.83 16.55 14.77 9.45
(24.06) (25.19) (20.29) (21.24)
Madrassa matched with IU 61.33*** 43.08+ 48.73*** 35.27+
(21.60) (26.27) (18.21) (22.15)
Madrassa matched with LU 67.87*** 50.13* 59.93*** 46.92**
(21.19) (26.03) (17.87) (21.96)
Madrassa matched with Madrassa 67.08*** 47.77* 54.26*** 39.82*
(20.43) (25.54) (17.23) (21.54)
Age  – −0.23 – −0.07
(0.95) (0.80)
Father’s years of schooling – −0.31 – −0.03
(0.79) (0.67)
Mother’s years of Schooling – −2.25** – −2.27***
(0.91) (0.77)
Parents’Income (in Rs. 100,000) – 0.04 – 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Father  attended Madrassa – 13.95 – 10.24
(10.41) (8.78)
Ever  attended Madrassa – −3.88 – −3.29
(11.56) (9.75)
Parents’Ownership index (0–8) – 2.80 – 2.25
(2.26) (1.90)
Watch  English-language news – −13.40 – −6.02
(9.36) (7.90)
Religiosity – 1.01 – 0.61
(1.18) (1.00)
Constant 168.96*** 190.62*** 192.15*** 206.71***
(18.96) (33.31) (15.99) (28.09)
Mean  of Dep Var 213.44 213.44 227.31 227.31
Number of observations 1512 1512 1512 1512
Table reports OLS regressions of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.
Signiicant at *p < 0.10, **p  < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
See Table 1 for description of all control variables.
a Gap = Average amount expected to be sent by trustees − actual average sent back.
ﬁnd) – this would suggest that Madrassas are not teaching distrust, but are on the contrary promoting trust and pro-social
behavior toward other members of the Pakistani society. Another possibility could be that the non-Madrassa institutions
promote distrust and less pro-social behavior or that there is negative selection into non-Madrassa institutions, in a way
similar to existing ﬁndings that economics students behave less cooperatively in experimental games (e.g., Carter and Irons,
1991; Frank et al., 1993). Again, given the high levels of trust and other-regarding behavior that we ﬁnd, this does not seem
to be likely. However, we cannot rule it out. If this is the case, our ﬁndings would be consistent with Madrassas teaching less
distrust/anti-social behavior relative to other higher education institutions.
We seek to investigate this in more detail in this section. In particular, we  investigate whether the difference in behavior of
the Madrassa students is due to observable characteristics that lead students to attend Madrassas (selection). One potential
explanation for the difference in behavior across groups could be systematic difference in preferences. In particular, lower
risk-aversion could explain why Madrassa students are more likely to invest in the trust game. This lower risk aversion could
be due to either selection or Madrassa attendance. However, Table 1 reveals that Madrassa students are on the contrary more
risk-averse on average than any of the other groups.
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We  next investigate the role of socioeconomic status. We  have seen that Madrassa students hail from humbler back-
rounds (Table 1), so their different social origin could possibly explain their trusting behavior. However, in the U.S context,
lesina and La Ferrara (2002) ﬁnd on the contrary that high-income groups tend to trust more. Using data from the 2000
orld Value Survey, we also ﬁnd that in Pakistan, higher income groups exhibit higher levels of trust, as measured by the
roportion of people who  state that “most people can be trusted these days” when asked “Generally speaking, would you
ay that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” (Panel A in Appendix Table
3). Among the educated groups we consider, socioeconomic status does not have much predictive power in the decision to
nvest in the trust game (see Appendix Table A2). So the difference in socioeconomic status is unlikely to be the main driver
f differences in behavior.
Another possibility is differences in levels of religiosity. This would be an issue in the interpretation of our results if
adrassa students had higher pre-existing levels of religiosity before enrolling into a Madrassa. Existing evidence suggests
hat religious rituals promote pro-social behavior (Iannacone, 1998; Rufﬂe and Sosis, 2007; Clingingsmith et al., 2009),
hough the evidence on the relationship between religiosity and trust and trustworthiness is mixed (Welch et al., 2004;
an and Vogel, 2008; Daniels and von der Ruhr, 2010; Putnam and Campbell, 2010).41 Religiosity alone, however, cannot
xplain the patterns that we observe across the institutions. Note that IU students rank second in terms of their average
eligiosity and adherence to religious practices, but are less likely to trust (Table 3) and to exhibit other-regarding behavior
Table 4) than Liberal University students. Moreover, when we  exclude the Madrassa students, we  do not ﬁnd any statistically
igniﬁcant relationship between religiosity and behavior in the games (table not shown). Finally, using data from Pakistan
rom the 2000 World Values Survey, we ﬁnd a non-monotonic relationship between religious attendances and trust (see
anel B in Appendix Table A3). So religiosity is also unlikely to be the main driver of differences in behavior.
Overall, it seems unlikely that selection into Madrassas by observable characteristics explains the trusting behavior of
he Madrassa students. We  are unable to directly investigate the extent to which selection into Madrassas by unobserva-
le characteristics may  impact our results, since we lack exogenous variation in the likelihood of individuals attending a
adrassa. However, given that controlling for observable characteristics has little impact on our results, we believe this is
uite unlikely. Overall, our results suggest that there is little evidence of Madrassas playing a negative role by promoting
istrust and anti-social preferences.
So what exactly is it about attending Madrassas that may  lead their students to be more trusting and selﬂess? Given that
adrassas are closed institutions, one may  argue that because their students have limited interactions with other society
embers, different aspects of their behavior are not fully formed yet and that, in that regard, their behaviors may  be similar
o those of children and teenagers. Existing research on behavior of children in experiments similar to ours shows that they
re less trusting than adults and that younger children are not more trusting than older ones (Harbaugh et al., 2003), and that
ltruistic behavior in the dictator game is weakly increasing with age (Benenson et al., 2007). Moreover, we  have additional
vidence that Madrassa students have knowledge of, and are exposed to, the “outside” world. For example they are aware
hat earnings after graduating from a Madrassa are substantially lower than the earnings conditional on graduating from a
iberal University.42 Additionally, their family members have been exposed to secular education. For example, the median
umber of years spent studying in secular institutions for Madrassa students’ fathers is 4 years (compared to 11 years for
on-Madrassa students’ fathers). It is therefore unlikely that something about the Madrassa isolation and lifestyle are the
ain driver of our results.
Related to this, some of the patterns that we uncover may  come from variation (across students in different school types)
n interaction with individuals belonging to out-group versus in-group.43 Rao (2014), for example, ﬁnds that exogenous
ariation in the number of poor students in Indian schools leads to an impact on the pro-social behavior of wealthy students,
nd that this is largely driven by interaction between the groups and not, say, changes in teaching practices. In our context,
tudents in Liberal Universities may  have limited interaction with Madrassa students, which may  then lead them to have less
ccurate perceptions regarding the trustworthiness of Madrassa students. One way to test whether differential familiarity
ith in-group versus out-group can partly explain our results is to compare in-group match and out-group match response
ariances. Tables 4 and 5 also report the standard deviation for each match. With the exception of the standard deviation
or the LU-M–Madrassa pairs (versus the LU-M–LU-M pairs in Table 4), none of the other 15 F-tests of equality of variances
re rejected.
Relatedly, Table 1 shows that at all non-Madrassa institutions, a non-negligible proportion of students’ parents or siblings
ttended a Madrassa. These students may  have a systematically different perception of Madrassa students. To investigate
his, we analyze the behavior for the two sets of students – those who have exposure to Madrassas (deﬁned as having a
ather, mother, friend, or sibling who ever attended a Madrassa) and those who  have none – when matched with Madrassa
tudents. We  ﬁnd similar patterns for the two groups, and cannot reject the equality of behavior (proportion that sends
41 Very related to our context, Fair et al. (2012) examine the links between multiple elements of religiosity and support for militant actions in Pakistan.
hey  ﬁnd that neither religious practice nor support for political Islam is related to support for militant groups, while views of the deﬁnition of jihad is.
42 Madrassa students correctly believe that, on average, students earn more than double if they graduate from LU-W compared to a Madrassa (detailed
esults  available from the authors upon request).
43 We thank a referee for pointing this out.
264 A. Delavande, B. Zafar / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 118 (2015) 247–267
money in the trust game; average dictator game behavior; expected trustworthiness) in any of the cases.44 Overall, this
suggests that differential familiarity with the various groups does not explain our results.
One possible channel that may  lead to our results is the nature of teachings at Madrassas and at the secular schools.
Since religious teachings in general promote selﬂessness, and studying certain secular subjects is associated with different
behavior with regards to cooperation and generosity (Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank et al., 1993),45 the emphasis of Madrassas
on religious teachings and their neglect of secular subjects (relative to the secular universities) may  be one reason for our
ﬁndings of high trust and high levels of pro-social behavior of Madrassa students. Similarly, while the Madrassas may  not
be able to really make their students become genuinely more pro-social, they may  inculcate the idea that deviating from
pro-social norms is socially very costly for them.
6. Discussion
Using experiments of economic decision-making (that measure trust and unconditional other-regarding behavior), we
investigated how Madrassa students in Pakistan interact with other groups of Muslim male youth of very different religiosity,
socioeconomic background and exposure to Western ideas. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that, in this context, Madrassa students are
amongst the most trusting, exhibit the highest other-regarding behavior, and expect others to be the most trustworthy. We
provide evidence that this distinct behavior is not driven entirely by selection on observables, suggesting that it is unlikely
that Madrassas inhibit inter-group trust among their students, at least toward other segments of the Pakistani society.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in the behavior of students in Madrassas belonging to the two  interpretive
traditions of Sunni Islam.
It is important to note that the four Madrassas we surveyed were not randomly selected, are mainstream, and located in
urban centers. Since most Madrassas are similar to the ones that participated in the study and most prominent Madrassas
are located in urban centers (and Madrassas across the country – including rural areas – tend to be afﬁliated with such
Madrassas), our ﬁndings would extend to the vast majority of those institutions in Pakistan. However, one should keep in
mind that Madrassas are heterogeneous and that our results pertain to mainstream Madrassas.
Though we cannot directly extend our conclusions to the role of Madrassas at grade-school or high-school levels, our
ﬁndings from this group of college-level students – most of whom have spent earlier years in Madrassas too, and in most
instances in the same Madrassa where they are pursuing college-level studies – are informative about the general role
of Madrassas as an institution. Given that trust and other-regarding behavior are negatively correlated with violence and
extremism (Sternberg, 2003; Lichbach, 2005; Nadler and Liviatan, 2006), our results would indicate that Madrassa reforms,
which are encouraged by the US government and favored by the Pakistani public, may  have only a limited impact on
violence in Pakistan. They also suggest that the negative stereotype of Madrassas is unwarranted. Our ﬁndings would be
hard to reconcile with the claim that Madrassas are the main perpetrators of domestic violence and hatred. However, more
research is needed to establish the causal role of Madrassas, particularly in fermenting international terrorism. For this
purpose, a natural extension to the setup in this paper would be to match students with groups of foreign individuals. One
may  be able to deal with the issue of selection by exogenously varying the salience of one’s identity (for example, as in
Benjamin et al., 2010b). While theoretically possible, the implementation of such a design may  be quite challenging but an
important avenue for future research.46
Another important ﬁnding from the experiment is the high levels of trust, trustworthiness and other-regarding behavior
in our data when compared to existing studies in the literature. It has been argued that hierarchical religions, such as
Catholicism and Islam, weaken trust (Putnam, 1993; La Porta et al., 1997).47 Since our sample consists of Muslims entirely,
the high level of trust found in this study is not consistent with this hypothesis. One possibility could be that Pakistan stands
out in terms of trust when compared to other countries, but evidence from other surveys suggests that this is not the case.
The World Value Surveys of 2000/2001 ask respondents from 70 countries whether “most people can be trusted” or one
“needs to be very careful in dealing with people.” In Pakistan, 31% of the people surveyed agreed with the statement that
most people can be trusted, which is very similar to the UK (30%) and the US (36%), and well below countries that are highly
ranked in terms of trust such as Iran (65%) or Denmark (66%).
A third important ﬁnding is that there is no evidence of systematic in-group or out-group bias for any of the groups we
consider in the investment decision in the trust game and no systematic discrimination in the dictator game. We do not
44 In other analysis (available from the authors upon request), we compare the behavior of Madrassa students matched with their own  Madrassa versus
those  matched with a different Madrassa. We,  again, ﬁnd no statistical difference in behavior. One exception is that the variance in expected trustworthiness
of  those matched with other Madrassas is statistically different (and larger) than those matched with own  Madrassa.
45 These papers ﬁnd that students in ﬁelds such as Economics are less trusting, less cooperative, and more selﬁsh. However, it seems that this relationship
is  driven primarily by selection into ﬁelds (Frey and Meier, 2005).
46 Our experimental setup focuses on games of trust and other-regarding behavior, and so we  are unable to say how these students would play in games
of  cooperation (such as public-good provision) and norm enforcement, in both the absence and presence of punishment. These alternative games may  shed
light  on other important aspects of social and economic life. However, implementing them generally requires feedback in real time, which is usually not
possible with paper-based experiments. Given the low computer literacy of certain subgroups of our sample, we chose not to include these other games.
47 There is an extensive body of work investigating the relationship between religion and trust or behavior in games arguing, for example, that Catholicism
inhibits  trust while Protestantism promotes it (Putnam et al., 1993; Benjamin et al., 2010a).
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nd that Madrassa students behave differently when matched with students attending Universities with strong Western
nﬂuence. Moreover, despite the fact that opinions collected from a subset of our respondents reveal that Madrassas are not
iewed positively and are perceived to play some role in fostering extremism and violence, and a large proportion of the
tudents have an acquaintance who died or was injured as a result of the violence in the country (Tables 1 and 2), we  do not
nd that any of the other groups behave differently when matched with Madrassa students.
A possible explanation for the lack of group membership bias could be the fact that our groups are unequal in terms of two
mportant social attributes: religiosity and socioeconomic background. Moreover, those attributes are negatively correlated
cross the groups. When groups are unequal, the lower status group tends to favor the higher status group (e.g., Jost et al.,
004). In our context, each student may  feel they are of higher status in one of the dimensions when matched with another
tudent. For example, Liberal University students may  feel that they have the highest socioeconomic status, while Madrassa
tudents may  feel that they have the highest status when evaluated on the basis of religiosity. Islamic University students,
ho fare in the middle on both dimensions, may  still feel that they have a higher status in terms of religiosity when matched
ith Liberal University students, and a higher status in terms of socioeconomic characteristics when matched with Madrassa
tudents. The interplay of this two-dimensional status may  thus weaken any group membership effect.
Another complementary possible explanation for the equal treatment, and also for the high level of trust and other-
egarding behavior we observe, may  be that violence within the society uniﬁes people and that other students do not see
he average Madrassa student as being responsible for it (despite not having positive perceptions of Madrassas themselves).
ecent evidence suggests that community exposure to violent conﬂict increases the willingness to invest in trust-based
ransactions and to contribute to a collective good within the community (Gilligan et al., 2010), enhances altruistic behavior
oward neighbors (Voors et al., 2010), and promotes local collective actions and political participation (Bellows and Miguel,
009; Blattman, 2009). Our paper does not directly test for the impact of community exposure to violence on trust, and takes
lace in a country where conﬂict is still on-going. However, given how widespread violence is in Pakistan, conﬂict may  play
 role in explaining our results.
An important aspect of our results is that Liberal Universities under-estimate the trustworthiness of Madrassa students,
uggesting that an important segment of the society has mistaken stereotypes about students in religious seminaries, while
adrassa students over-estimate the trustworthiness of Liberal University students. These incorrect stereotypes could neg-
tively inﬂuence the social and economic interactions of those two groups outside of the lab. Moreover, since graduates of
iberal Universities are most likely to be future policy makers, their incorrect stereotypes could result in inefﬁciencies in
ociety. Note that since our sample excludes outlier radical Madrassas (which, by deﬁnition, are hard to identify and recruit
n practice), we do not know if these perceptions of non-Madrassa students are entirely inaccurate. Non-Madrassa students
ay form their perceptions based on outlier Madrassas, and their perceptions may  correctly reﬂect how radical Madrassa
tudents would behave. This is something we cannot rule out.
Overall, our ﬁndings offer some cautiously optimistic perspectives for Pakistan’s future.48 Of course, the high and non-
iscriminatory levels of trust we ﬁnd pertain to highly educated groups. However, those groups are likely to be important
ctors in the economic activity of the country. Several African countries have experienced remarkable post-conﬂict economic
ecovery and one of the many channels may  be that institutions, including trust, have improved as a result of the conﬂicts
Cramer, 2006). We  can only hope that Pakistan will have a similar fate.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
.jebo.2015.03.020.
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